This article examines the role of the Spanish Atomic Forum as the representative of the nuclear sector in the public arena during the golden years of the nuclear power industry from the 1960s to 1970s. It focuses on the public image concerns of the Spanish nuclear lobby and the subsequent information campaigns launched during the late 1970s to counteract demonstrations by the growing and heterogeneous antinuclear movement. The role of advocacy of nuclear energy by the Atomic Forum was similar to that in other countries, but the situation in Spain had some distinguishing features. Antinuclear protest in Spain peaked in 1978 paralleling the debates of a new National Energy Plan in Congress, whose first draft had envisaged a massive nuclearization of the country. We show how the approval of the Plan in July 1979, with a significant reduction in the nuclear energy component, was influenced by the anti-nuclear protest movements in Spain. Despite the efforts of the Spanish Atomic Forum to counter its message, the anti-nuclear movement was strengthened by reactions to the Three Miles Island accident in March 1979.
Introduction
The atomic debate erupted into the public sphere of Western countries during the 1960s and 1970s with confrontations between anti-nuclear activists and pro-nuclear associations. Waves of anti-nuclear protest spread rapidly in countries that had invested heavily in nuclear programs to meet the energy crisis in 1973.
Public perception of nuclear power was becoming increasingly negative, and the term nuclear evoked widespread fears about accidents, radioactivity or bombs. In this context, the future of nuclear was highly dependent on public and political acceptance. Pro-nuclear coalitions were mainly composed of nuclear scientists and engineering firms, electric utilities, nuclear plant manufacturers, and agencies promoting nuclear power, i.e., the so-called "Atomic Industrial Establishment" (Lewis 1972) . During the 1950s, Industrial Nuclear Forums were founded by pro-nuclear lobbies in countries utilizing or developing nuclear power. Their aim was to communicate favorable information on specific projects and on nuclear power in general in order to enhance the credibility of the nuclear industry and improve its public acceptance.
The main goal of this study was to analyze the role played by the nuclear industry in Spain during the 1960s and 1970s in the context of a growing antinuclear movement and increasing concerns among the general population. There is a wide historiography on the introduction and development of nuclear energy in Spain, but it has mainly addressed political, military, or technological issues (Presas i Puig 2005, Romero and Sánchez-Ron 2001; Ordóñez and Sánchez-Ron 1996) . Research has also focused on anti-nuclear activity in Spain during the final years of Franco regime (Costa 1976; Fernández 1999; López Romo 2008; López Romo and Lanero Táboas 2010) . However, little attention has been paid so far to the role of the industry itself in the development of nuclear power in Spain or to the actions taken to counteract the rising anti-nuclear movement in the 1960s and 1970s.
In a first attempt to fill this historiographical gap, we focused on the Fórum Atómico Español (Spanish Atomic Forum, hereafter FAE), the industrial association that promoted the interests of the nuclear sector in Spain. We sought to identify and clarify the main arguments of the nuclear sector in the Spanish public arena by analyzing the abundant material published by the FAE during the period from 1962 through 1979, starting with the setting up of the FAE and ending after the Three Miles Island (hereafter TMI) accident. We shall also discuss the relevance of the accident in Harrisburg as a significant turning point in Spanish public opinion on the nuclear industry.
We focus on the last years of this period, 1977 to 1979, which coincided with the discussion of a new National Energy Plan (hereafter NEP) in Congress, with some important local protests, and with the TMI accident. We completed our study of trends in Spanish public opinion by analyzing pro-nuclear and antinuclear discourses in two leading newspapers of the time, ABC and El País, and in two of the most important regional newspapers, La Gaceta del Norte and El Periódico de Catalunya.
Anti-nuclear movements in the decades of protest
The 1960s were marked by public discontent organized in different types of protest movement, including the anti-nuclear wing of the environmentalist movement, the feminist movement, and the peace movement, with a varying degree of interactions among them (Kriesi et al. 1995: 8; Giugni 2004: 44-45) . However, although the 1960s have usually been perceived as the decade of protest, it was the 1970s in which a wide variety of social movements entered the public arena (Freeman and Johnson 1999: 5) . They maintained most of the structural goals underlying their creation during the 1960s, but their concerns and strategies changed in accordance with the new times.
The anti-nuclear movement provides a good illustration of this development. Nuclear power has always been controversial, and the distrust of the population and their gradual resistance were already manifest by the mid-1950s, mainly in protests by peace and nuclear disarmament movements against the hazards of nuclear weapons testing and their effects on the environment and neighboring populations (Taylor, 1994) . Nevertheless, public awareness of nuclear risks was not widespread until the expansion of nuclear power programs during the 1960s, when many more communities were affected by siting proposals (Surrey and Hugget 1976; Rudig 1990 ).
The construction of nuclear power plants was promoted with particular intensity by governments during the 1973 energy crisis to reduce their dependence on oil and supposedly provide a cheap source of electricity. This development was led by the USA nuclear industry. In early 1973, the American Energy Commission (hereafter AEC) predicted a huge increase in nuclear capacity, with industry executives talking of "a net increase in utility commitment to nuclear power" and "the virtual collapse of competition from fossil fuels" (Walker 2006: 7-8) . Several citizens' groups emerged to confront the expansion of the nuclear industry, and the 1970s saw a shift in the anti-nuclear movement toward protests against the development of 4 nuclear power as a source of energy. The nuclear power conflict became described as one of the most intense controversies in the history of technology (Kitschelt 1986: 57) . Anti-nuclear movements pursued distinct strategies and had a different impact on overall energy policy in each national case, depending on the political opportunity structure of the country in question (Kitschelt 1986: 57-85; Shawki 2010: 383-385) .
1 However, they all shared a number of common features that shaped the anti-nuclear struggle: a previous protest movement against nuclear weapons testing and against radioactive pollution; a rapid rise in environmental concerns during the 1960s; a movement towards greater social responsibility in science; and new cultural and political values opposed to the economic system and energy growth. 2 Most of these concerns were also important to environmentalist and pacifist movements, but the anti-nuclear movement was distinguished by its focus on the specific risks of nuclear power, including the large-scale effects of a potential accident, the possibility of long-term mortality from cancer, the potential genetic effects on future generations, and the association between nuclear power and nuclear weapons (Surrey and Hugget 1976: 286-288; Rudig 1990 ).
The opposition to nuclear power was greater than expected, especially in Europe. In France, the first two decades of nuclear development took place in an atmosphere of political consensus, free from any public opposition until the early 1970s, 3 Nevertheless, there were strong anti-nuclear protests against new siting proposals, especially in Fessenheim (1971) and Marckolsheim (1974) on the German border. A wave of protest rapidly spread to Germany and Switzerland, helped by the political opportunities presented in both countries through mass mobilizations for regional claims (Kriesi et al. 1995: 181) .
Anti-nuclear protests were connected across Europe, with the different movements imitating successful tactics employed in other countries (Kriesi et al. 1995; Taylor, 1994; Rudig 1990; Falk 1982; Mills and Williams 1986) . They argued for a slowing in the growth of energy consumption and for the development of other energy sources, emphasizing the need for safeguards in relation to the transport, reprocessing, and disposal of radioactive materials (Surrey and Huggett 1976: 297-298; Rudig 1990: 112-130) . Major demonstrations against government nuclear plans took place in different countries during the 1970s. The successful "Whyl experience" in Germany 4 encouraged other mobilizations throughout Europe, 1 "Political opportunity structures are comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements, and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others." (Kitschelt 1986: 58) . 2 While we can find some similarities between the protests in Europe and the USA, Japan represents a particular case. The bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the severe seismic conditions and the Bikini incident produced a complex and conflictive scenario around nuclear energy in Japan. The anti-nuclear opposition in Japan has been widely discussed by several authors, who have described the different facets of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement. For instance, Akaha (1985: 75-89) reports the influence of the anti-nuclear movement in the parliamentary resolution that has guided Japanese nuclear policy since the late 1960s, known as the "three nonnuclear principles"; while Higuchi emphasizes the environmentalist origins of the Japanese anti-nuclear movements against the centrality of Hiroshima and Nagasaki within this activism (Higuchi 2008) . Nevertheless, there is a wide consensus about the major importance of the movement against nuclear tests in the mid-1950s, and more than one-third of the Japan population had signed a petition to ban nuclear tests by the summer of 1955 (Yamazaki 2009: 132-145) . 3 Political, economic and labor representatives worked together to rebuild the national industry complex, and they agreed in the creation of a new electric utility (Electricité de France) and the atomic energy commission, strongly supported by De Gaulle (Hetch 1996: 486-488) . 4 Wyhl, a small village in the southwestern corner of Germany, was proposed in 1971 as a possible site for a nuclear power station. In the years that followed, the incipient local opposition had little impact on politicians and planners. Official permission for the plant was granted and earthworks began on February 17 1975 (Patterson 1986: 113) . Just the day after, local people spontaneously including strong protests in Austria, Switzerland, France, and Spain (Mills and Williams 1986: 375-376 (Giugni 2004: 44-45 ).
The backlash: Reaction of the industrial lobbies
During the post-war years and the Cold War, the positive perception and acceptance of nuclear power was influenced by propaganda techniques and communication campaigns targeting public opinion. The best example was the Atoms for Peace program developed by the Eisenhower administration (Krige 2006; Weart 1988; Hewlett and Holl 1989; Forgan 2003) .
When the civil atomic programs started in the 1950s, they were led by different governmental nuclear agencies and involved both private and public investment (Hewlett 1990 (Caro et al. 1995: 398) .
After the first substantial opposition to a planned reactor in the 1950s in the USA (Goodman 1961) , leaders of the industry started to become worried about a hazard that was new for them. 5 By 1969, the AIF's Public Affairs and Information Committee was alarmed about the rising anti-nuclear movements and about the growing national press coverage of the issue. 6 During the early 1970s, even some of the most aggressive promoters of nuclear energy at the political level took serious note of the environmental concerns and antinuclear opposition. Several states proposed more restrictive environmental legislation for nuclear sites occupied the site and the police used force to remove them two days later, on February 20. Television coverage of the rough treatment of the local farmers by the police contributed to turn nuclear power into a major national issue (Fach and Grande 1992: 20) . Subsequent support came from the university town of Freiburg, when about 30,000 people re-occupied the Wyhl site on February 23. The Wyhl occupation and the subsequent demonstration in Freiburg generated extensive debate in Germany and, on March 21 1975 an administrative court withdrew the construction license for the plant (Rudig 1990: 130-135; Mills and Williams 1986: 375-376; Gottlieb 2005: 237) . The plant was never built and the land eventually became a nature reserve. The importance of the Wyhl experience in encouraging the emergence of local and regional grassroots activism has been highlighted (Mills and Williams 1986: 375-376; Rudig 1990 ). The growing protest after the Whyl conflict has been described as a prelude to the "sudden death" of the nuclear program in the late 1970s (Fach and Grande 1992: 20-21 ). Anti-nuclear success at Wyhl also inspired nuclear opposition in the rest of Europe and North America (Patterson 1986: 113; Gottlieb 2005: 237; Rudig 1990: 130-135) . 5 The members of the AIF and the insurance companies pointed out that the risks associated with fuel production, reprocessing and waste storage were as great in the long term as those associated with the reactors. See Damian (1992: 606) . 6 The Chair of this Committee cited the article "The nukes are in hot water", published in 1969 by Sports Illustrated, as the first indication of this change (Balogh 1991: 264) . (Balogh 1991: 265-285) . Consequently, the AIF and the energy-utility complex focused their efforts on the delegitimization of the anti-nuclear movement rather than on a public debate about nuclear hazards.
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The best example of this public struggle was "Proposition 15" in the California election in June 1976. The Proposition called for stricter legislative regulation of the nuclear power industry, and inspired six similar ballots in other states and in Switzerland. Representatives of the industry feared that success of the Proposition would have an anti-nuclear domino effect (Wellock 1998: 149) . The nuclear industry in the USA, led by the AIF, made available a large number of documents arguing the pro-nuclear case. They mainly highlighted the possible economic effects of a nuclear moratorium, the environmental problems of coal mining, and the illegality of the Proposition (Kenward 1976) . Notwithstanding the eventual rejection of the Proposition, it was perceived by the nuclear industry as a bittersweet victory because it had contributed to a gaining of momentum and influential support for the anti-nuclear movement (Wellock 1998: 332) .
By the early 1970s, the electric companies were finding it increasingly difficult to obtain project licenses, and several projects in Europe and Japan had been withdrawn by 1972 due to local opposition (Young 1983: 1-16) . Support for nuclear power was led by the national industrial associations, which launched various communication campaigns highlighting the need for nuclear power in the context of an energy crisis. These campaigns detailed the high safety standards in nuclear industry and promoted consultation processes and public discussions with representatives of local communities, unions, and other civil associations affected by siting proposals (European Nuclear Society 1979; Surrey and Hugget 1976: 299-300; Hetch 1996: 488-489; Yamazaki 2009: 137-138.) . In Spain, they also played on fears of becoming over-dependent upon oil and emphasized the presence of uranium reserves in the country (Sánchez-Vázquez 2012: 77-78).
By the late 1970s, every country with a commercial nuclear program had experienced its own antinuclear reaction with specific national characteristics. Advocates of nuclear energy were surprised by the intense public opposition to the large scale application of this energy source. However, the experience drawn from public hearings, debates, and face-to-face discussions with representatives of the anti-nuclear movements made them aware "of modes of thought and criteria of judgment that they had not previously encountered" (Häfele 1974: 303) .
The nuclear industry in Spain (1962-1976)
The importance of the military nature of Franco regime in shaping the early Spanish interest in nuclear technology (Presas i Puig 2005; Ordóñez and Sánchez-Ron 1996) was consolidated by the discovery and exploitation of uranium deposits in Spain in the early 1950s. 8 Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Program 9 and 7 As it was put by Frank Shants, special project manager of the New Hampshire Public Service Company "Instead of trying to arouse the public for nuclear power, we should change course and try to arouse the public against the antinuclear groups ..." (Davidon 1979: 46) . 8 Spain began its own production of uranium on an industrial scale, becoming the third country in Europe, after United Kingdom and France, with a pilot chemical treatment plant (Caro et al. 1995: 50-56) . 9 The Spanish case shows the propaganda facet of the Atoms for Peace programme to perfection (Weart, 1988: 162-165 agreement made it clear that the USA effectively controlled nuclear matters in Spain through the AEC. It also pointed out that "private organizations in either the USA or Spain may deal directly with private individuals and private organizations in the other country (Ordóñez and Sánchez-Ron 1996: 195-196) . 10 The favorable climate of opinion in the Conference, as well as the estimations for the consumption of electricity in the sixties, pointed clearly to nuclear power as a solution, even when its economic viability remained controversial. (Weart 1988: 158; Barca Salom 2005: 163-181 contributing to create what has been called the Spanish version of the "Nuclear Iron Triangle" 12 , which brought together politicians from the government, technicians and scientists from the Nuclear Energy Board, and representatives from private companies (De la Torre and Rubio 2014: 16).
The Spanish nuclear industry "boom" began in 1963, when a newly founded company, Nuclenor, was licensed to build a nuclear power station in Santa María de Garoña, Burgos. The reactor was purchased "keys-in-hand" from General Electric. Simultaneously, the company Cenusa applied for permission to build a new power plant in Zorita, Guadalajara, which, in 1968, became the first to be successfully completed and operative in Spain. The reactor was purchased from Westinghouse (Romero de Pablos, 2012: 49-54; Caro et al. 1996: 355-360 There is a surprising lack of references to the incident in FAE publications. Up to this point, almost all references in FAE publications about anti-nuclear demonstrations or public opinion came from abroad.
14 This could be attributed to the immaturity and lack of developed structure of the anti-nuclear movement in Spain and to the government support for the sector, but it may also reflect a conscious strategy of the nuclear lobby to invisibilize the movement.
However, in response to the considerable number of new nuclear power plants planned in the first NEP in 1975, a strong anti-nuclear movement emerged in the 1970s in Spain, which ultimately prevented the completion of most of the projects. All of the local and regional demonstrations against the new planned stations became known as the Long Anti-Nuclear March (Larga marcha antinuclear) (Fernández 1999: 119-14 In the Boletines Informativos of 1966, periodicals edited by the FAE during that year, there is a total lack of references to the incident (Fórum Atómico Español, 1966a (Costa 1976: 50-75) .
Given the political situation in Spain during the 1970s, it would not be accurate to refer to a homogeneous "Spanish" anti-nuclear movement. The anti-nuclear protests were closely linked to nationalist and pro-independence movements in regions like Catalonia, the Basque Country or Galicia, which influenced the shaping and development of these protests (Mora Ticó 2012; López Romo and Lanero Táboas 2010; López Romo, 2008) . In fact, the proliferation of discourses and collective actions of opposition to nuclear power plants became a valuable tool for nationalist movements to expand their presence in the public arena in terms of the political opportunities presented by mass mobilizations. In other Spanish regions, the arguments against nuclear power were posed in non-nationalist terms, and the protests contributed to strengthening the associative movement and the demands for democracy (López Romo and Lanero Táboas 2010: 751-752).
In order to coordinate and draw together these regional mobilizations, a national organization was created in Soria in May 1977: the Anti-nuclear State Coordinator (Coordinadora Estatal Antinuclear,
hereafter CEA). It was driven by such organizations as the Anti-Nuclear Committee of Catalonia (Comité

Antinuclear de Cataluña), or the Defense Committee for a Non-Nuclear Basque Coast (Comisión de Defensa de una Costa Vasca No Nuclear).
CEA did not have a stable structure or a fixed membership for organizations, which were able to join and leave freely. It usually met three times a year, with periods of higher and lower frequency (Cabal 1996; Bigas 1991: 91-99 FAE's publications included several statements by representatives of the industry and nuclear institutions that expressed confidence in government support but also evidenced some disquiet about the outbreaks of unexpected opposition. This increasing anxiety is reflected in the topics chosen for FAE conferences and lectures. By 1977, the Spanish nuclear sector was fully aware of the problems related to the anti-nuclear movement. 15 The Annual Nuclear Symposium organized by the FAE that year included a session devoted to "Nuclear Energy and Public Opinion", in which Spanish nuclear industry representatives described their increasing concerns about the public reaction (Fórum Atómico Español, 1977c).
Lemóniz conflict, the drafting of the second National Energy Plan and the reaction of the Spanish 15 As reflected in periodicals published during 1976 and 1977, which started to express the increasing worries of the sector (Fórum Atómico Español, 1976 , 1977a , 1977b .
Atomic Forum (1978)
Two major approval at that time. The Minister of Industry supported this reduction by arguing that the earlier nuclear plans had been based on an accumulated annual economic growth of around 6% that had been reduced to 4%. The new draft was the cause of bitter controversy between the Ministry and the private sectors involved in the nuclear program (El País 1978c).
The daily press also reflected the rising anti-nuclear environment. In May 1978, the newborn centerleft newspaper El País published an editorial entitled "Promises and dangers of nuclear energy" (El País 1978d) . It criticized the huge investment planned for the construction of nuclear power plants (estimated at around 325,000 million pesetas). It criticized the government's commitment to nuclear energy as a means of limiting the dependence on oil, claiming that it ignored the potential hazards of environmental pollution or catastrophic accident.
A month later, the sociologist Mario Gaviria, one of the leaders of environmental activism in Spain, described "planning errors committed by the main electric companies between 1969 and 1972, when they decided on the nuclearization of Spain" (El País 1978e). According to Gaviria, the NEPs were ideological documents used to correct successive forecast errors by the electricity sector and to support investment by private companies in nuclear power plants. He also suggested that the underlying objective of the Plan, advocated by the Americans and supported by the Spanish electric and nuclear sector, was to replace oil with nuclear energy (El País 1978e).
The FAE emerged as the public representative of the nuclear sector in response to this negative environment for nuclear energy in Spain. The FAE made strong efforts to counteract the opposition through public interventions in the print media, radio and TV. Alfonso Álvarez Miranda, the president of the FAE, led these appearances in the media during the first half of 1978, with forthright statements that "saying no to nuclear energy, is saying yes to the recession and unemployment" and that "causes of opposition to nuclear power have no serious scientific basis but underlying emotional causes, as the memories of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki" (ABC 1978a). He also described the opposition to nuclear energy as more ideological than technical, and insisted that nuclear energy was necessary, safe and affordable (ABC 1978b) . Hence, the nuclear sector strategy focused on the need for nuclear energy for economic development and attempted to delegitimize the opposition as "less technical" and prone to unfounded fears associated with the memories of Hiroshima and nuclear bombs tests. These arguments were similar to those propagated by other nuclear lobbies during the 1970s.
Besides the FAE, the nuclear option was strongly supported in this debate by other representatives of the private energy sector, such as the managers of oil and electric companies, as revealed in a "Survey among energy sector experts" published by ABC in May 1978.
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18 The survey was conducted among five leading experts of the Spanish energy sector. These experts were Alfonso Alvarez Miranda, president of FAE; Emilio Sanz Hurtado, manager of the oil company Petroliber and member of the Technical Commission of the Minister of Economy for the drafting of the NEP; Roberto Centeno, manager of the energy company Campsa and also member of the Technical Commission of the Minister of Economy; Juan Alegre Marcet, president of Unesa (Association of Spanish electric companies), and Julio Calleja González-Camino, president of Hispanoil (another oil company). The survey comprised two questions: 1. Do you support nuclear energy? 2. Would you nationalize the sector? To the first question, all five answers were "yes", and in a categorical manner. For the second question, there was a more nuanced response, with 2 "yes" and 3 "no" (ABC 1978c) .
A draft of the second NEP was presented to Congress in July 1978, after major amendments to earlier drafts. According to El País, the positive reaction of the electrical and nuclear sectors indicated that the private sector had again won the battle (El País 1978f) . However, the NEP failed to gain approval, and public debate on energy policy continued throughout the second half of 1978, with no changes in the arguments presented by each side (El Periódico de Catalunya 1978a).
The first turning point in the nuclear debate was prompted by the celebration of the Austrian referendum on nuclear energy on November 5 1978, related to approval for the start-up of the Zwentendorf Nuclear Power Plant (Hirsch and Nowotny 1977; Pelinka 1983: 253-261) . The referendum resulted in a narrow majority against the Zwentendorf plan and represented an unexpected defeat for the European nuclear lobby as a whole. The right-wing newspaper ABC published a special report on the possibility of a nuclear referendum in Spain (ABC, 1978d) that included statements by representatives of the nuclear sector (e.g., the FAE President and the Director of the Nuclear Energy Board) on the need for nuclear energy to ensure the economic development of the country (ABC, 1978e) . The "bases of the anti-nuclear opposition"
were described by the ABC editorial staff on the same page as: the incomplete or developing nature of the technology; ecological disruption and pollution; lack of economic viability; progressive restriction of freedoms to guarantee the security of nuclear facilities; higher concentration of economic and political power; and increasing foreign dependence in energy matters (ABC 1978f).
The FAE intensified its efforts to counteract the increasingly negative perception of the public and to daily press that cast nuclear energy in a negative light (Fórum Atómico Español 1978d: 32-35) . The public information campaign also involved the publication of documents and public reports advocating nuclear energy, the selection of audiences and topics for conferences or talks given by members of the FAE, and the achievement of media coverage for their presentations (Fórum Atómico Español 1978b: 24) .
Further research is required to establish whether FAE's public information campaign was effective in changing the public perception of nuclear energy. However, one example of the limited success of FAE's attempts to reshape the debate on nuclear energy in Spain may be the objections to the NEP draft raised by all political groups when it was discussed in Congress in December 1978, leading to the need for it to be redrafted once again (El Periódico de Catalunya 1978b).
The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident and the decline of the nuclear industry in Spain
The TMI accident is known as the first "major" accident in nuclear industry history. It occurred at TMI Power Plant in Pennsylvania, on March 28 1979. It represented a major shock to the nuclear industry, which had emphasized the safety of the plants as one of the main arguments in the pro-nuclear discourse during the 1970s. While the public health consequences of the accident remain controversial and have been described as "frustratingly ambiguous" (Walker 2000) , consensus has been achieved on its major impact on the economy and on public opinion. According to the IAEA, the TMI accident was a significant turning point in the global development of nuclear power. 20 However, it has been claimed the accident did not initiate the demise of the nuclear power industry, as many planned nuclear power plants in USA had already been canceled between 1973 and 1979. 21 The first reactions to the accident came from the US Nuclear industry representatives. In a display of humility and concern, the president of the AIF Carl Walske declared: "I thought we were better than that before the accident happened". In addition, William J. Lannouette, a journalist specialized in nuclear power, reported that some of them were "stunned and dispirited" (Walker 2006: 222) . The nuclear sector as a whole decided to take action to deal with the crisis. The AIF established a committee to coordinate communication activities, realizing that this accident could cause severe damage to the nuclear industry worldwide (Walker 2006: 223) .
In Spain, the impact of the accident on public opinion was a matter of great concern to FAE leaders and the pro-nuclear lobby. Fears were also raised about its effects on the prospects for the NEP, which had yet to be approved and remained under public debate (Fórum Atómico Español 1979b: 5-7). At a conference held in Bilbao on the day after the accident, the new President of FAE, José Antonio Gallego Gredilla, stated that they had to stick to the "cold language of science, facts, and logic" against the "emotional and passionate arguments" used by anti-nuclear protestors (La Gaceta del Norte 1979).
During 1979, some major anti-nuclear demonstrations took place in Spain against the NEP and in favor of a nuclear moratorium, especially in Barcelona (El Periódico de Catalunya 1979a 1980 to 1984 (EIA 1983 . 21 As a result of post-oil-shock analysis and conclusions of overcapacity, many planned nuclear power plants had already been canceled between 1973 and 1979 due to more stringent Federal requirements, more strident local opposition and significantly lengthened construction times (Hertsgaard 1983: 95-97) .
withdrawn from Congress and replaced by a transitional strategy that excluded nuclear energy (El País 1979a).
The nuclear industry sector feared that the impact of the accident would focus the debate exclusively on nuclear policy. There were also concerns about the plants under construction and those with prior authorization sector, given the support for the nuclear moratorium announced by the Socialist and Communist parties (Fórum Atómico Español 1979a: 17-20 The new NEP was eventually approved by Congress on July 27 1979. The absence of previsions for the massive nuclearization of the country is attributable to the active civil opposition to the plan, the TMI accident, and delays in the construction of the new nuclear power plants due to the immense investment costs involved, among others (Cuerdo 1999: 161-178) . Priority was given to local resources, such as coal and hydraulic power, as had been proposed in the second draft of the Plan. The approved NEP gave nuclear energy a place as a complementary source for completing the energy supply, but only under "the strictest security measures" (El País 1979b) . This was seen as a victory for the environmentalist and anti-nuclear movements in Spain (Fernández 1999: 302) and a discouraging decision for the nuclear sector and the FAE.
In late March 1984, the Socialist government approved a moratorium, and only 11 out of the 37 originally planned commercial nuclear reactors (including 20 already licensed) were finally built in Spain.
Conclusion
Although nuclear energy had been a controversial issue since the 1950s, the expansion of the nuclear industry during the 1960s and 1970s stimulated the growth of anti-nuclear movements and brought the nuclear debate into the public arena. Despite the complexity of the international anti-nuclear scenario in the late 1970s, several general trends can be identified, including the intensification of the protest as the growth of nuclear programs increased and the coalition of different interest groups against nuclear energy. Nuclear industrial associations emerged and played a key role in advocating nuclear energy with varying degrees of support from the national governments.
As in other countries developing a nuclear program, the FAE took a leading role as representative of the Spanish nuclear sector. The lack of democracy in the 1960s reduced the importance and public visibility of anti-nuclear movements. Not surprisingly, therefore, FAE's concerns about public opinion emerged later than in other countries. By the mid-1970s, the combination of an intense anti-nuclear struggle and growing calls for democracy in Spain led the FAE to enter the public arena with different communication strategies.
Their main arguments included the need for nuclear power to meet increasing energy needs, the problems of coal and alternative energy sources, and the high safety record of nuclear power. Their strategy was to oppose anti-nuclear claims on nuclear costs, safety and waste management.
Anti-nuclear protests peaked in Spain in the late 1970s during the long debate before approval of the second NEP in July 1979, confronting the pro-nuclear discourse with warnings about the potential dangers and the enormous investment required. The anti-nuclear movement in Spain was heterogeneous and highly influenced by regionalist and nationalist movements and by the demands for democracy, which gave anti- 
